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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the ratiability of an ecient ring when the seller uses the rst-price
sealed-bid auction with participation costs and potential information leakage in the sense that
bidders may update their information through pre-auction knockouts within the independent
private values setting.
Auction is an eective way to extract private information by improving the competitiveness
of potential buyers and thus can increase allocation eciency from the perspectives of both
sellers and the social planner. Eciency, however, is diminished when buyers' collusion occurs.
Nevertheless, asymmetric information between bidders makes it dicult to protably collude
and share the collusive surplus, which may destabilize a collusive ring. Some members in the
ring may have incentive to veto a cartel mechanism. As Osborne (1976) indicates, when an
ecient cartel mechanism is not freely implemented, a cartel may face both external and internal
problems. A cartel has to anticipate and prevent outside production in order to avoid external
threat. The internal problems include those in designing the rule, dividing the prot, detecting,
and deterring cheating.
Much of the literature on collusion then tries to overcome cartel's problems mentioned above.
For the external problems, vindictive strategies are a method which is usually used to enforce
collusion (Cooper, 1977). For the internal problems, Roberts (1985) shows that the method
of side payments is a dominant strategy for every member to join the cartel. Under dierent
assumptions, the requirements of a successful collusive mechanism may be dierent: Graham
and Marshall (1987) analyze a knockout mechanism organized by an outsider is ecient and
sustainable. The knockout mechanism is also ex ante budget-balanced among bidders. Mailath
and Zemsky (1991) discover that for any subset of bidders, there is an incentive compatible
and individually rational collusive mechanism, which is ex post budget-balanced and ecient.
Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990) nd when heterogeneous members exist, nested coali-
tion structures are observed at each level of nesting. Cramton and Palfrey (1990) show when
uncertainty exists, regardless of the ratication rule, a perfect collusion is possible in a large
cartel.
As the synthesis of standard mechanism design literature, McAfee and McMillan (1992)
explore the bidding strategies in rst-price sealed-bid auctions under two cases: weak cartel
and strong cartel. In a weak cartel, bidders cannot make transfer payments, and in a strong
cartel, the members can exclude new entrants and make transfer payments among themselves.
The model consists of one seller and n bidders. The seller's behavior is passive. She sets a
reserve price for the object, and holds a legitimate auction to sell the object. She does not
know whether she faces a cartel or not. Bidders can place identical bids in the seller's legitimate
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auction to achieve the optimal outcome without colluding. When side payments are prohibited,
the incentive compatibility condition requires that the object should be allocated with equal
probability to anyone whose value is greater than the seller's price. Bidders treat the seller as
their randomizing device by placing equal bids.
In a strong cartel, the optimal cartel mechanism can reach the eciency by implementing a
prior auction before the seller's legitimate auction. The cartel will choose the bidder with the
highest value to participate in the seller's auction. Since all bidders are in the cartel originally
but only one participates in the seller's auction, he can submit the lowest bid that is equal to the
seller's reserve price, and win the auction with certainty. The transfer payment is the dierence
between the winning bid in the prior auction and seller's reserve price. This transfer payment
is distributed equally among all members in the cartel. With this extra payment, everyone in
the cartel is better o than they would be in the non-collusive case, so no one has incentive to
betray the cartel.
Despite the solutions mentioned above, many still argue that rst-price auctions are eec-
tive in reducing the gain from the collusive behavior. The solutions are obtained from the
comparison of bidders' interim payos. As Marshall and Marx (2007) state, when cartels cannot
control members' bids, in rst-price auctions, the cartel cannot eliminate all members' competi-
tion. Besides, shill bidding strategies reduce the protability of collusive behavior at rst-price
auctions.
However, under (interim) individual rationality constraints, there may be a strategic interac-
tion among bidders in the seller's auction, and its outcome would be aected by bidders' beliefs
about others' values. Besides, there may be a participation cost involved in the seller's auction,
which may make an ecient collusive mechanism inecient, whatever the auction format is.
Thus, there are two constraints that a cartel mechanism must pay attention to. One is
the information leakage problem in the sense that bidders may update their information from
their participation decisions in the prior auction. Cramton and Palfrey (1995) show that when
the information leakage problem exists, bidders' participation decisions in the prior auction
would disintegrate the optimal cartel mechanism. Bidders can observe which bidder's value is
highest from his choice of whether to veto the collusive mechanism, which in turn may aect
the seller's revenue. Bidders may then set up a two-stage game: all players simultaneously vote
for or against the collusive mechanism. This vote is held at the interim stage. If the collusive
mechanism is unanimously accepted, it is implemented; otherwise they participate in the seller's
auction with updated information.
The other constraint is that bidders may incur some costs, such as entry fees or sunk costs,
when they participate in an auction. After the costs are incurred, a bidder may submit a bid.
Mills (1993) points out that the bidding cost in a government procurement auction often runs
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in the range of millions of dollars. If a bidder's expected revenue from an auction is less than
the participation costs, he will not attend the auction.
Tan and Yilankaya (2007) apply the ratiability introduced by Cramton and Palfrey's (1995)
to investigate whether ecient collusive bidding mechanisms are aected by potential informa-
tion leakage and participation costs. They show that when the seller uses a second-price auction
with participation costs, the standard ecient cartel mechanisms are not ratied by cartel mem-
bers. However, as Tan and Yilankaya (2006) point out, there are several empirical studies that
oer evidence of collusion in many auction markets, including highway construction contracts,
federal oshore oil and gas lease auctions, etc. In these auctions, it is a rst-price sealed-bid
auction that is generally used. Since the rst-price auction is often used in practice, one then
is wondering whether an ecient all-inclusive cartel mechanism can still preserve its ecien-
cy when seller uses a rst-price auction with participation costs and bidders can update their
information through a cartel's prior auction within the independent private values setting.
We will answer this question by considering a two-stage ratication game, following Cramton
and Palfrey (1995) and Tan and Yilankaya (2007). In the rst stage, the ring uses the knockout
mechanism to coordinate bidding. Members send their bids to the ring in the (pre-auction)
collusive mechanism which indicates the target that they are interested in, and how much they
are willing to pay for it. The ring collects all members' bids, and determines the winner of the
target and the side payments after the seller's auction concludes. Side payments are used by the
cartel to compensate cartel members for not competing for the target in seller's auction. They
simultaneously vote (interim) for or against the ecient cartel mechanism. In the second stage,
if the cartel mechanism is unanimously accepted, it then is implemented; otherwise, bidders
participate in the rst-price auction, knowing who had vetoed the cartel mechanism and thus
having updated beliefs about vetoers' values.
We will determine a veto set, such that if a bidder's value belongs to the set, he will choose
to betray the cartel. With the veto set and the optimal inverse bidding function obtained in Cao
and Tian (2010), we allow the presence of both participation costs and information leakage in
the strong cartel studied by McAfee and McMillan (1992). However, we obtain a dierent result.
We show that, when the seller uses a rst-price auction, the usual ecient cartel mechanisms
will no longer be ratiable in the sense that a bidder vetoes a pre-auction in the presence of both
participation costs and potential information leakage. The bidder with a value greater than a
critical point in the cartel will have an incentive to veto. By vetoing the mechanism, a bidder
sends a credible signal that he has a relatively high value, which discourages other bidders from
joining the seller's auction when there are positive participation costs. However, even if there
is information leakage so that bidders can update their information through a cartel's collusive
mechanism, the usual ecient cartel mechanisms would still be ratiable provided there is no
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participation cost. As such, there is a discontinuity about ecient collusive mechanisms at zero
participation cost. A policy implication for this is that, in practice, the seller can charge some
entry fee to decrease the possibility that bidders may form a cartel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment. Section 3 considers the benchmark case where no information leakage is allowed.
Section 4 allows the presence of information leakage and investigates the ratiability of ecient
cartel mechanisms. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are included in the appendix.
2 Economic Environment
Consider a standard independent private-valued economic environment with one seller and n
(n  2) potential bidders. The set of bidders is denoted by N . The seller values her object
at r 2 [0; 1]. She announces the reserve price r and sells an indivisible object to the bidder at
the highest bid in a rst-price sealed-bid auction, in which the bidder who submits the highest
bid wins the object and pays what he bids. In order to simplify the calculation and notation,
we assume that the reserve price r = 0. The analysis and results hold when there is a binding
reserve price.
Bidder i's value is vi, i 2 N , which represents i's willingness to pay for the object in the
auction, and v = (v1; :::; vn) is the vector of n bidders' prole. vi is private information which is
a random draw from the same cumulative distribution function F () with continuous and strictly
positive density function f() supported on [0; 1].
In order to submit a bid, each bidder needs to pay non-refundable participation costs common
to all bidders and denoted by c 2 [0; 1). Bidders do not know others' participation decisions
when they make their own decisions. When a bidder is indierent between participating and not
participating in the seller's auction, we assume that he participates for illustration convenience.
When a bidder submits a bid, he cannot observe the number of bidders who submit bids. Only
the winner in the seller's auction must pay his bid, and all participants in seller's auction have
to pay the participation costs.
Bidders may form a cartel. The seller is assumed to be passive; i.e., she does not know
whether she faces a cartel.
3 Non-Collusive Auction and Ecient All-Collusive Cartel Mech-
anisms
In this section, we assume there is no information leakage problem in the sense that no bidders
can update their information through the cartel's prior mechanism. We consider two extreme
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cases. One is that no bidder forms a cartel, i.e., non-collusive auction, and the other involves
everyone in a ring, i.e., all-collusive mechanism. We compare bidders' choices between the
non-collusive and collusive games without information leakage.
3.1 Non-Collusive First-Price Auction
The auction format for the seller is the rst-price auction. Let v be the cuto point, which is de-
termined by c = vF (v)n 1. It is obvious that v > c. Following Menezes and Monteiro (2000),
there exists a unique (up to changes for a measure zero set of values) symmetric (Bayesian-Nash)
equilibrium where each bidder's bidding function (vi) is monotonically increasing when bidder
i with value vi participates in the seller's auction, given by
(vi) =
R vi
v ydF (y)
n 1
F (vi)n 1
;
when vi  v. If vi < v, bidder i does not participate in the auction. When vi  v, the
non-collusive prot si (vi) for bidder i is
si (vi) = [vi   (vi)]F (vi)n 1   c:
Thus, with integration by parts and some simplications, bidder i's expected revenue is given
as follows.
si (vi) =
8<: 0 vi < vR vi
v F (y)
n 1dy vi  v:
3.2 Ecient All-Collusive Cartel Mechanism
An ecient cartel designs an incentive-compatible all-inclusive (symmetric) mechanism, which
maximizes the sum of bidders' expected revenues with transfer payments.1 This ecient cartel
mechanism exists for n > 2.2 Bidder i reports his value to the cartel mechanism before the
seller's auction and mi (0) is the transfer payment received by each cartel member. As the
assumption in McAfee and McMillan (1992), some punishment is available to the cartel, so no
cartel member will break the ring when the ring dictates that he bids to lose.3
1This ecient cartel mechanism is what we called \strong cartel", which is shown to be ratiable in McAfee
and McMillan (1992).
2Che and Kim (2006) show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a broad class of circumstances with
more than two agents (n > 3) for correlated types and more than one agent (n > 2) for uncorrelated types. As
for two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated types, Meng and Tian (2013) show that collusive
behavior cannot be prevented freely.
3This is because we focus on the constraints of the cartel that result from the privacy of the cartel members'
information. The cartel should ensure obedience to the cartel's orders when the cartel is ratied.
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The ecient cartel mechanism works as follows. While the bidders report their values to the
cartel mechanism, the ith bidder is awarded the object with probability pi(wi; v i), where wi is
the value reported from bidder i and v i is a vector of other bidders' values. Zi() is the total
transfer payment which the winner has to pay in the cartel.4 Then, bidder i's expected revenue
in the cartel mi (wi; v i) in the prior auction with value vi and reports wi, can be written as:
mi (wi; v i) = E i[pi(wi; v i)(vi   Zi(wi; v i)  c)]+
1
n  1E i[(1 pi(wi; v i))Z i(wi; v i)];
where the rst term on the right side is the expected revenue if he wins the prior auction, the
second term represents the expected revenue if he loses, and E i is the expectation over v i.
For any bidder, after dropping the bidder's indices to simplify the notation, m(w; v) becomes:
m(w; v) = [v   Z(w)  c]F (w)n 1
+ [1  F (w)n 1]
Z 1
w
[
Z(u)
n  1]
(n  1)F (u)n 2f(u)
1  F (w)n 1 du
= [v   Z(w)  c]F (w)n 1
+
Z 1
w
Z(u)F (u)n 2f(u)du:
Bidders choose w to maximize m(w; v). In an incentive compatible mechanism, w = v. Note
that @
m(w;v)
@v = F (w)
n 1 and denote F (w)n 1 = G(w), we can write
m(v) =
8<: m(0) if v < c:m(0) + R vc G(u)du if v  c: (1)
The cartel's total revenue is the expected dierence between the winner's value and the
participation costs. The density function of the winner's value is nF (v)n 1f(v). The total
revenue for the cartel, c(v), must equal total expected revenues:
c(v) =
1
n
Z 1
c
(v   c)nF (v)n 1f(v)dv
=
Z 1
0
m(v)f(v)dv
= m(0) +
Z 1
c
Z v
c
F (u)n 1duf(v)dv
= m(0) +
Z 1
c
[1  F (v)]F (v)n 1dv:
Thus, the transfer payment m(0) is
m(0) =
1
n
Z 1
c
(v   c)nF (v)n 1f(v)dv
 
Z 1
c
[1  F (v)]F (v)n 1dv
=
Z 1
c
[y   1  F (y)
f(y)
  c]G(y)dF (y):
4mi (0) =
1
n 1Zi()
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Table 1: Side payments from an ecient cartel with $0 reserve price
Knockout auction Bid Side payments
Bidder A 0.9 0:9 0:14 = 0:2
Bidder B 0.7 0:9 0:14 = 0:2
Bidder C 0.6 0:9 0:14 = 0:2
Bidder D 0.3 0:9 0:14 = 0:2
Reserve price 0
Participation costs 0.1
Since v > c and m(0) > 0, we obtain
m(v) > s(v): (1)
This means that the ecient cartel mechanism satises bidders' individual rationality condi-
tions. Bidders in the cartel earn more prot, whether they win the object or not. For instance,
suppose that target price is $0 as our assumption in Section 2, and consider the participation
cost $0.1, every member in the ecient cartel could earn an extra $0.2 in side payments as
compared to the non-collusive case (as we show in Table 1).
As compared with non-collusive auction, all bidders prefer to form a cartel. This is true for
all 0  c < 1; i.e., it does not matter whether there is a participation cost in the seller's auction
or not. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no information leakage. Then the strong cartel mechanism is
ecient and interim individually rational with respect to symmetric equilibrium payos in the
seller's auction no matter whether there is a participation cost.
The assumption that there is no information leakage is certainly unrealistic. As long as
bidders are rational, they would update their information, if any, through the cartel's prior
auction before they participate in the seller's auction. Will this cartel mechanism still result in
ecient outcome in the presence of participation costs? We address this question in the next
section.
4 Ratiability of Ecient Cartel Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate the ratiability of ecient cartel mechanisms with both partic-
ipation costs and the possibility that bidders may update their beliefs through the bidders'
participation decisions. In this case, the bidding strategy of a bidder in the seller's auction
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usually depends on the bidder's beliefs about others' values, which in turn may be aected by
the decision of participation in the cartel.
Again, we assume that the seller's auction is the rst-price auction with participation costs.
The cartel mechanism is as follows. The cartel holds a prior auction before the seller's auction.
After bidders report their bids to the cartel, the cartel chooses the bidder with the highest bid
to represent the cartel in the seller's auction.
With information leakage, we design a knockout cartel mechanism with c  0. When c > 0,
bidders have to pay when they participate in the seller's auction. Specically, the timing of
possible cartel formation between date 0 and date 1 works as follows:
 At date 0, an ecient cartel mechanism exists and all bidders belong to the cartel.
 At date 13 , nature draws a private valuation for each bidder.
 At date 23 , bidders vote for or against the ecient cartel mechanism simultaneously.
 At date 1, if all bidders accept the ecient cartel mechanism at date 23 , it is implemented
and the winner in the prior auction represents the cartel to bid in the seller's auction, and
he will compensate the losers with transfer payments. Otherwise, if at least one bidder
rejects the collusive mechanism, no collusion occurs. Bidders bid in the seller's auction at
date 1 noncooperatively.
In order to show that bidders may have incentive to exit the cartel, we dene a veto set
Ai for each i 2 N . If the vetoer's value is in this set, he will veto the cartel; that is, vetoing
the cartel brings more prot to the vetoer than he would gain in the collusive case. If a bidder
is indierent between staying in and vetoing the cartel, he will choose to stay in the cartel.
vi (vi; b) denotes the vetoer's payo at equilibrium b, and 
m
i (vi) is the payo when he stays in
the cartel. Formally, we have the following denitions.
Denition 1 A set Ai with ; 6= Ai  [0; 1] for bidder i is said to be a credible veto set if there
exists an equilibrium b in the post-veto auction such that vi (vi; b) > 
m
i (vi) , vi 2 Ai.
Denition 2 The cartel mechanism is ratiable, if there is no credible veto set for all i 2 N .
If bidder i vetoes the cartel,5 other bidders will update their beliefs about the vetoer i's value
and identify that the vetoer's value belongs to the credible veto set Ai after bidder i chooses
to exit the cartel, and the cartel mechanism may not be supported. Suppose that when bidder
i vetoes the cartel, others believe that his value is in (vN ; 1], where \N" is for saying \no" to
5Since we are looking for the possibility that all bidders unanimously ratify the cartel mechanism, it is sucient
to be only concerned about the unilateral deviations.
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the cartel mechanism (the vetoer), and vN is an upper bound at which the bidder is indierent
between vetoing and staying in the cartel. Ai = (vN ; 1] is then a credible veto set for bidder i.
We will show that there is an asymmetric equilibrium of the auction with these updated beliefs,
such that the vetoer's payo at the equilibrium is larger than his payo in the cartel if his value
is larger than vN . As such, the vetoer has an incentive to betray.
When bidder i vetoes the cartel, his value is updated to be distributed on (vN ; 1] according
to FN (v)  F (v) F (vN )1 F (vN ) , which is derived from F (:) using the Bayes' rule. For all other bidders,
the expected revenue of participating in the seller's auction is a non-decreasing function of their
true values. Thus with participation cost, a bidder uses cuto strategy in which he submits a
bid if and only if his value is greater than or equal to a cuto.
Now, for simplicity, suppose there is only symmetric equilibrium,6 i.e., the cuto points used
by all collusive bidders to decide whether or not to participate in the seller's auction are the
same and denoted by vY , where Y is for saying yes (ratiers). Thus when both the vetoer and
the other bidders participate in the seller's auction, we have an asymmetric rst-price auction in
the sense that bidders' valuation distributions are on dierent supports. Now we consider this
asymmetric rst-price auction in which the ratiers' values are distributed on [0; 1] according
to F (:) and vetoer i's value is distributed on [vN ; 1] according to FN (:) given earlier. Let i(vi)
and j(vj) be the bidding functions of the vetoer and the ratiers when they participate in the
seller's auction. Then, by Maskin and Riley (2003), there is a unique optimal bidding strategy
and bidders with the same cuto use the same bidding function when participating. For the
vetoer,
bi (vi) = i(vi) 8vi 2 (vN ; 1]:
For a typical ratier bidder j (j 6= i),
bj (vj) = b

 i(vj) =
8<: N0 vj < vYj(vj) = (vj) vj  vY 8j 6= i:
Note that vY  vN since otherwise a collusive bidder with value vY has no chance to win in
the seller's auction while still incurring the participation cost c, which makes a vY type collusive
bidder's participation irrational. Thus if there are any ratiers in the seller's auction, the rival's
value is distributed on [vY ; 1], which makes a vN type vetoer have no chance of winning and
thus bid zero.
When both vetoer and ratier bidders have a chance of winning in the seller's auction, the
6It should be noted that the collusive bidders may use dierent cutos as studied in Cao and Tian (2010),
which may complicate our analysis considerably. However, if F () is inelastic, i.e., F (v)  vf(v) for all v 2 [0; 1],
then there is a unique equilibrium (cf. Cao and Tian (2010)).
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vetoer bidder i's bid b can be determined by the following maximization problem:
max
b
F (vj(b))
n 1(vi   b):
Similarly, a ratier bidder j's bid can be solved by the following problem:
max
b
F (vi)  F (vN )
1  F (vN ) F (vj(b))
n 2(vj   b):
The optimal inverse bidding functions vi(b) and vj(b) when participating,
7 according to Cao
and Tian (2010), are uniquely given by the rst order conditions: For all b < b  b with
b = max argmaxb
F (b) F (vN )
1 F (vN ) F (vY )
n 2(vY   b),
vi(b) = b+
F (vj(b))
(n  1)f(vj(b))v0j(b)
; (2)
vj(b) = b+
[F (vi(b))  F (vN )]F (vj(b))
(n  2)f(vj(b))v0j(b)[F (vi(b))  F (vN )] + F (vj(b))f(vi(b))v0i(b)
; (3)
with boundary conditions vj(b) = vY , vi(b) = b and vi(b) = vj(b) = 1.
Remark 1 When vN < vi < b, the vetoer bidder has no chance of winning when there is any
ratier bidder participating in the seller's auction and thus he can do no better than bidding
zero. On the other hand, when no ratier bidder participates, his best choice is still to bid zero.
As a vetoer bidder with vN < vi < b, he can win the auction only when there are no other
bidders participating in the seller's auction.
Remark 2 The information structure we adopted follows Menezes and Monteiro (2000). A
bidder does not know who else is in the auction when he submits a bid, which is a dierent spec-
ication from Cao and Tian (2010). Menezes and Monteiro (2000) only focus on the symmetric
equilibrium at which all bidders use the same cuto point (which is equal to v) and submit
bids via the same bidding function. We focus on the asymmetric equilibria where bidders use
dierent cuto points.
Rewriting equation (2), we have
v
0
j(b) =
F (vj(b))
(vi(b)  b)(n  1)f(vj(b)) :
Substituting in vj(b) gives:
vj(b) = b+
[F (vi(b))  F (vN )]F (vj(b))
(n  2)[F (vi(b))  F (vN )]f(vj(b))[ F (vj(b))(vi(b) b)(n 1)f(vj(b)) ] + F (vj(b))f(vi(b))v
0
i(b)
= b+
F (vi(b))  F (vN )
(n 2n 1)(
F (vi(b)) F (vN )
vi(b) b ) + f(vi(b))v
0
i(b)
: (4)
7vi(b) and v i(b) are from bi = i(vi) and b i = j(vj) = (vj) with bi = bj = b.
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Since the inverse bidding function is monotonically increasing in b, the relationship is uniquely
determined. Dene Q(vi(b))  vj(vi), where Q(vi(b)) is the relationship between vj and vi when
b = bj = bi, and k(vi) is the probability that given vi > vN , the vetoer i's bid is greater than
bidder j's.
k(vi) = P (bi > bj jvi > vN )
= P (vj < Q(vi)jvi > vN )
=
P (vj < Q(vi); vi > vN )
P (vi > vN )
=
R 1
vN
f(vi)
R Q(vi)
0 f(vj)dvjdvi
1  F (vN )
=
[1  F (vN )]F (Q(vi))
1  F (vN )
= F (Q(vi)):
Let H(vi) = k(vi)
n 1 be the probability that all other bidders' bids are less than vetoer
i's. For any other bidder, the distribution of the maximum of others' bids is given by H^(y) 
k(y)F (y)n 2, with y 2 (vN ; 1]. Let ~vY be the solution to
[~vY   b i(~vY )]H^(~vY ) = c:
The payo of a ~vY type bidder is equal to his participation costs, whenever ~vY  1. We have
vY = minf1; ~vY g. Notice that vY is the cuto point where other bidders are indierent between
staying in and vetoing the cartel. An increase in vN leads to a higher vY . Thus we have that
vY is a strictly increasing function of vN until it reaches 1 for some value of vN and stays there
for greater value of vN . The payo of vetoer i is
vi (vi; b
) = maxf[vi   i(vi)]H(vi)  c; 0g:
We rst consider the simple case where c = 0 under the assumption that bidders can update
their beliefs from the cartel's mechanism. With the information gained through the cartel's
mechanism, if there is a vetoer of the cartel after the cartel's auction, other bidders can enter
the seller's auction for free and bid as much as possible to make the vetoer earn a prot that is
less than or equal to his cartel revenue. The game becomes the basic collusive model in McAfee
and McMillan (1992). mi (vi)  vi (vi; b) = si (vi).
Proposition 2 The ecient cartel mechanism is ratiable when c = 0, even if the information
leakage problem exists.
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Remark 3 This conclusion is dierent from that in Tan and Yilankaya (2007) who claimed
without proof that the ecient cartel mechanism is not ratiable when c = 0.8 This is because
the vetoer's betraying signal becomes an \incredible threat" without participation costs.
Now we consider the general case where participation costs are positive and the information
leakage problem exists, and have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a rst-price sealed-bid auction, suppose c > 0 and the information leakage
problem exists. Then the strong ecient cartel mechanism is no longer ratiable.
Remark 4 With the unilateral deviation in the very beginning ecient all-inclusive cartel, the
remaining n   1 bidders may still possibly form another non-all-inclusive cartel to participate
in the seller's auction. Marshall and Marx (2007) investigate similar cases in the absence of
participation costs. If this is the case in our model, then in the seller's auction, there will be
only two potential participants including the vetoer (contrary to n potential participants in the
seller's auction in our setting). The approach we employed in this paper can still be applied in
this case and our main result remains true.
By combining the results of Propositions 2 and 3, one can see that there is a discontinuity
at c = 0. When there is no participation cost, the strong cartel mechanism is still ecient
even though information leakage is allowed. However, when participation cost is positive and
information leakage is possible, the strong ecient cartel mechanism is no longer ratiable. The
intuition is that, having updated their beliefs that the vetoer's value belongs to Ai, other bidders
with low values would not participate in the seller's auction because they would have to pay the
non-refundable participation costs and earn negative prots, which in turn results in a positive
eect on the expected revenue of the vetoer with a suciently high value. As a result, the cartel
mechanism is not ratiable.
Thus, we show that the ecient cartel mechanism cannot be ratiable when both the infor-
mation leakage problem and positive participation costs exist. When participation costs exist
without information leakage problem, as Proposition 1 addresses in the previous section, the
strong cartel mechanism is still ecient. This ecient cartel mechanism is designed to maxi-
mize bidders' ex post prot. Without the information leakage problem, bidders cannot update
their beliefs through cartel's auction, so no one has incentive to exit the cartel. On the oth-
er hand, when the information leakage problem exists without participation costs, this cartel
mechanism is still ratiable. Since bidders can submit a bid in the seller's auction for free, the
vetoer cannot earn extra prot from betraying the cartel. Thus, the ecient cartel mechanism
is still possible even if there is participation cost or the information leakage problem, but not
8Actually, they are even not quite sure about their claim without further investigating why.
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when both are present. However, when both exist simultaneously, the ecient cartel is no longer
ratiable.
Remark 5 When bidders have dierent participation costs, which means that bidders report
the level at their values minus the participation costs, the highest-value bidder may not be the
winner in a cartel because he may have higher participation costs. As in Proposition 3, we can
get a similar result: when the information leakage problem exists, the bidder with the largest
net value dened by the dierence between his value and his participation cost would have an
incentive to betray the cartel to maximize his payo.
To illustrate the main conclusion of this section, we give the following example.
Example 1 Suppose F (v) = v, the uniform distribution on [0; 1] and n = 2. vN is determined
by the indierence between staying in and vetoing the cartel and thus we have
m(0) +
Z vN
c
F (u)du = vNF (vY )  c;
where the left side is the expected revenue for staying in the cartel while the right side is the
expected revenue from participating in the seller's auction minus participation cost c (when
vi = vN , he can win the auction only if he is the single bidder because if there is any other
bidder, it must be vj  vY > vN .). With F (v) = v, the above equation is equivalent to
vNvY   c = 1
2
v2N  
c
2
  1
6
c3 +
1
6
:
vY is determined by the zero net payo for a ratier bidder who participates in the seller's
auction. For the ratier bidder j with vj = vY , his expected payo from participating in the
auction is given by (assuming vY  1 since otherwise the ratier bidder never participates)
max
b
F (b)  F (vN )
1  F (vN ) (vY   b)  c = 0:
The above maximization problem gives b = vY +vN2 . Zero net payo gives
vY   vN =
p
4c(1  vN ):
Now we have two equations on vY and vN . Our numerical examples show that, when
c  0:1755, the ratier bidder never participates and vN is determined by
vN   c = 1
2
v2N  
c
2
  1
6
c3 +
1
6
:
For example, when c = 0:1755, vN = 0:2980; when c = 2=3, vN = 0:686.
Now consider an extreme case where c approaches zero. From the rst condition, we can get
vY vN =
1
2v
2
N +
1
6 , and from the second condition, we can get vY   vN = 0. The two conditions
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give vN = 0:577, which implies that even when c = 0, the cartel mechanism is not ratiable.
However, the problem here is when c = 0, the vetoer bidder needs to worry about not only the
ratier bidder with value in [vY ; 1], but also the ratier bidder with value in [0; vY )
9. Considering
this, bidders will not have any incentive to deviate. To see this, consider the rst-price auction
in which the vetoer bidder's value is distributed on [vN ; 1] with FvN (v) =
v vN
1 vN and the ratier
bidder's value is distributed on [0,1] with F (v) = v. For the vetoer with value vN , he maximizes
(vN   b)F (b) with respect to b, which gives an expected payo of 14v2N . The payo for staying
in the cartel is 12v
2
N +
1
6 . Then in this case it is impossible to nd a vN 2 [0; 1] such that
1
4v
2
N =
1
2v
2
N +
1
6 . Thus, when c = 0, the vetoer does not have incentive to veto the cartel. There
is a discontinuity between c = 0 and c > 0.
5 Conclusion
Buyers' collusion usually brings some losses to the seller's expected revenue and reduces the
allocation eciency. When participation costs exist, bidders cannot bid in the legitimate auction
for free. When bidders' actions are strategically interactive and their outcome is aected by
bidders' beliefs about others' values, the standard mechanism design approach may suer from
the information leakage problem. After the prior auction, if the winner chooses to betray the
cartel, he will be the only bidder in the legitimate auction. He can bid the lowest value and win
with certainty. With the above facts, it is clear that the winner in the cartel has incentive to
betray the cartel; hence the ecient cartel mechanism is no longer sustainable in the presence of
positive participation costs and the information leakage problem. This observation may provide
important suggestions for the government to dierentiate cartels or to prevent the formation of
a cartel.
9A positive participation cost will eliminate the ratier bidder of this type.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Equation (1):
To see equation 1, we only need to consider the following three cases:
Case 1: if v > v > c, then m(v) = m(0) +
R v
c F (u)
n 1du and thus s(v) =
R v
v F (y)
n 1dy <R v
c F (y)
n 1dy < m(v) with m(0) > 0.
Case 2: if v  v > c, then m(v) = m(0) + R vc F (u)n 1du and s(v) = 0; it is obvious that
m(v) > s(v).
Case 3: if v  c, then m(v) = m(0) > 0 and s(v) = 0. Again we have m(v) > s(v).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the case when information leakage problem exists and c = 0. There are two groups of
bidders, the vetoer with the cuto point vN and the cartel members with the cuto point vY
with vY = minf1; ~vY g. As ~vY is the solution to
[~vY   b i(~vY )]H^(~vY ) = c;
when c = 0, we get
[~vY   b i(~vY )]H^(~vY ) = 0:
In a rst-price auction, the ratier bidder with value VY will bid below his true value, so
H^(~vY ) = 0.
Noting that H^(y)  k(y)F (y)n 2 with y 2 (vN ; 1], when y = vN , H^(vN ) = 0: Thus we get
[vN   b i(vN )]H^(vN ) = 0:
Compared with
[~vY   b i(~vY )]H^(~vY ) = 0;
we have ~vY = vN = v
 = 0 because c = vF (v)n 1, which means that the bidders in the cartel
and the vetoer use the same cuto point 0. The optimal bidding function becomes
(vi) =
R vi
0 ydF (y)
n 1
F (vi)n 1
:
In this case, if the cartel does not exist, the game becomes the non-collusive game without
participation costs. Thus, the winner's expected payo is
vi (vi; b
) = si (vi) =
Z vi
0
F (y)n 1dy;
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which is less than
mi (vi) = 
m
i (0) +
Z vi
0
G(y)dy:
As we show in Section 3.2, when c = 0, the vetoer's revenue is always less than or equal to the
revenue he would obtain from staying in the cartel. This is because the losers in cartel's auction
can participate in seller's auction with no participation cost. With updated information, they
can bid as much as possible to cause the vetoer to earn less prot than he would from the cartel.
Thus, the bidder with value vi 2 Ai does not veto the cartel in this case.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove this result, we only need to show there exists a vN 2 (c; 1) such that vi (vi; b) > mi (vi)
if and only if vi > vN .
We examine three possible cases when vetoer i vetoes the cartel. The rst case is that
viG(vY ) < c; i.e., his expected payo is less than his participation costs. No matter whether other
bidders participate in the seller's auction or not, the vetoer will not join the auction. The second
case occurs when c  viG(vY )  bG(vY ), with b = max argmaxb F (b) F (vN )1 F (vN ) F (vY )n 2(vY   b).
In this case, the vetoer can win the auction only when no ratier bidder participates. The vetoer
chooses to participate in seller's auction because his expected payo is larger than c. The third
case occurs when vi > b. The expected revenues in the three cases are
vi (vi; b
) =
8>><>>:
0 vi <
c
G(vY )
viG(vY )  c cG(vY )  vi  b
viH(vi)  i(vi)H(vi)  c vi > b:
The expected revenue in the cartel is:
mi (vi) =
8<: mi (0) vi < c:mi (0) + R vic G(y)dy vi  c:
We want to show:
vi (vi; b
) > mi (vi) 8vi > vN :
We will rst nd a vN for which 
v
i (vN ; b) = 
m
i (vN ), and then check the inequality.
Step 1: To show 9vN 2 (c; 1) such that vi (vN ; b) = mi (vN ). Since cG(vY )  c, if vN  c, we
have mi (vN ) = 
v
i (vN ; b) = 0, which is impossible. When vY  vN > c, we have vi (vN ; b) =
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vNG(vY (vN ))  c; and mi (vN ) = mi (0)+
R vN
c G(y)dy; i.e., we need vNG(vY (vN ))  c mi (0) R vN
c G(y)dy = 0: Let
(vi) = viG(vY (vi)) 
Z vi
c
G(y)dy   c  mi (0);
and
0(vi) = G(vY (vi)) + viG0(vY (vi))v0Y (vi) G(vi)
= [G(vY (vi)) G(vi)] + viG0(vY (vi))v0Y (vi):
Since G() is an increasing function and vY (vi)  vi, we have G(vY (vi))   G(vi) > 0 and
v0Y (vi) > 0. Therefore, 
0(vi) > 0 and
(c) = cG(vY (c))  c  mi (0) = c[G(vY (c))  1]  mi (0) < 0;
(1) = G(vY (1)) 
Z 1
c
G(y)dy   c  mi (0)
= 1  c 
Z 1
c
G(y)dy   mi (0):
Now we prove
R 1
c [1 G(y)]dy > mi (0), where mi (0) =
R 1
c [y   c  1 F (y)f(y) ]G(y)dF (y). We know
(1) = 1G(vY (1)) 
Z 1
c
G(y)dy   c  mi (0)
= 1  c 
Z 1
c
G(y)dy  
Z 1
c
[y   1  F (y)
f(y)
  c]G(y)dF (y)
=
Z 1
c
(1  F (y)n)dy  
Z 1
c
yG(y)dF (y) +
Z 1
c
cG(y)dF (y)
=
Z 1
c
(1  F (y)n)dy   1
n
[1 
Z 1
c
F (y)ndy] +
c
n
=
n  1
n
[1  c 
Z 1
c
F (y)ndy]:
Since F (y)n  1, R 1c F (y)ndy  R 1c 1dy = 1  c. We have (1)  0.
For vi < 1 and vY (vi)  vi, since (vi) is continuous, (c) < 0 and (1)  0, a unique
solution to (vi) = 0 exists, and is our candidate for vN .
Step 2: We want to show vi (vi; b
) > mi (vi) 8vi > vN . Fix c, hence vN and vY are xed,
and we have c  cG(vY )  vN  vY . The payo dierence vi (vi; b)   mi (vi) is continuous and
given by:
vi (vi; b
) mi (vi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 mi (0) vi < c I
 mi (0) 
R vi
c G(y)dy c  vi < cG(vY ) II
viG(vY )  c  mi (0) 
R vi
c G(y)dy
c
G(vY )
 vi  b III
viH(vi)  i(vi)H(vi)  c  mi (0) 
R vi
c G(y)dy vi > b IV
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I,II: vi (vi; b
)  mi (vi) < 0; when vi < cG(vY ) :
III: Let '(vi) = viG(vY )  c 
R vi
c G(y)dy   mi (0), as '(vN ) = (vN ) = 0, we have '0(vi) =
G(vY ) G(vi) > 0 when vi < b, and '0(vY ) = 0. Therefore,
'(vi)
8>><>>:
< 0 vi < vN
= 0 vi = vN
> 0 vi > vN :
Thus, '(vY ) is strictly positive.
IV: H(vi) = F (Q(vi))
n 1.
d
dvi
[vi (vi; b
)  mi (vi)] =
d
dvi
[viH(vi)  i(vi)H(vi)  c 
Z vi
c
G(y)dy   mi (0)]
= H(vi) + viH
0(vi)  i(vi)H 0(vi))  0i(vi)H(vi) G(vi)
= (vi   i(vi))H 0(vi) + (1  0i(vi))H(vi) G(vi):
Denote X = (vi   i(vi))H 0(vi) + (1  0i(vi))H(vi) G(vi). i(vi) = vi   F (vj)
(n 1)f(vj) @vj@b
.
X = [
F (vj)
(n  1)f(vj)@vj@b
](n  1)F (Q(vi))n 2f(Q(vi))Q0(vi)
+ F (Q(vi))
n 1[
f(vj)
2 @vj
@vi
@vj
@b   F (vj)f 0(vj)
@vj
@vi
@vj
@b   F (vj)f(vj)
@2vj
@b@vi
(n  1)f(vj)2(@vj@b )2
]  F (vi)n 1
=
(n  1)F (vj)n 1f(vj)2 @vj@vi
@vj
@b + F (vj)
n 1f(vj)2
@vj
@vi
@vj
@b
(n  1)f(vj)2(@vj@b )2
  F (vj)
nf 0(vj)
@vj
@vi
@vj
@b + F (vj)
nf(vj)
@2vj
@b@vi
(n  1)f(vj)2(@vj@b )2
  F (vi)n 1
=
nF (vj)
n 1f(vj)2
@vj
@vi
@vj
@b   F (vj)n[f 0(vj)
@vj
@vi
@vj
@b + f(vj)
@2vj
@b@vi
]
(n  1)f(vj)2(@vj@b )2
  F (vi)n 1
=
F (vj)
n 1 @vj
@vi
@vj
@b [nf(vj)
2   F (vj)f 0(vj)]  F (vj)nf(vj) @
2vj
@b@vi
(n  1)f(vj)2(@vj@b )2
  F (vi)n 1:
With
@vj
@b
=
F (vj)
(vi   b)(n  1)f(vj) ;
and
@2vj
@b@vi
=
f2(vj)
@vj
@vi
(vi   b)(n  1)  F (vj)(n  1)f(vj)
[(n  1)f(vj)(vi   b)]2
  F (vj)(vi   b)(n  1)f
0(vj)
@vj
@vi
[(n  1)f(vj)(vi   b)]2 ;
we have
X = (n  1)F (vj)n 2(vi   b)@vj
@vi
f(vj) + F (vj)
n 1   F (vi)n 1:
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Replace vj with Q(vi) in F (vj)
n 1,
X = (n  1)F (vj)n 2(vi   b)@vj
@vi
f(vj) + [F (Q(vi))
n 1   F (vi)n 1]:
The rst part of X, (n  1)F (vj)n 2(vi   b)@vj@vi f(vj), is positive because the bidding function is
monotonically increasing with Q0(vi) =
@vj
@vi
> 0.10
For the second part of X, [F (Q(vi))
n 1 F (vi)n 1]. Q(vi) is the relationship between vi and
vj when bi = bj . Since vi 2 (vN ; 1], when bi = bj , at least we should have vj  vi. Otherwise,
bidder i can bid b = vN to win. Thus, we have Q(vi)  vi, which means that X > 0.
When X > 0, we have [vi (vi; b
)   m(vi)] is increasing given vi > b. Thus, vi (vi; b) >
m(vi) when vi > vN . Q.E.D.
10vj(vi) = Q(vi) is the relationship when vi(bi) = vj(bj). When vi increases, bi increases, which means that bj
increases with a larger vj .
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